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Apr. 1954] TAENAKA v. STATE BoARD OF EQUALIZATION 657 
[42 C.2d 657; 263 P.2d 4721 
(1951), 38 Cal.2d 166, 182 [238 P.2d 1001]; Ex parte Rosen-
heim ( 1890), 83 Cal. 388, 391 [23 P. 372] ; People v. Sayre 
(1937), 26 Cal.App.2d Supp. 757,761 [70 P.2d 546].) 
For all of the reasons above stated, I would affirm the judg-
ment. 
Edmonds, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied April 
28, 1954. Edmonds, .J., and Schauer, J., were of the opinion 
that the petition should be granted. 
[L. A. No. 22903. In Bank. Apr. 2, 1954.] 
TOSHIKUNI 'rAENAKA, Respondent, v. STATE BOARD 
OF EQUALIZATION et al., Appellants. 
[1] Intoxicating Liquors-Licenses-Persons Entitled.-Alcoholic 
Beverage Control Act, § 7.1 (Stats. 1951, ch. 1457), providing 
for reinstatement of liquor licenses to persons who were de-
prived of them because of their Japanese ancestry, is a remedial 
provision in which legislative purpose was to rectify what 
Legislature felt was an injustice, and patent object of this 
legislation was to restore such licenses to their former owners 
at positions formerly occupied by them. 
[2] !d.-Licenses-Persons Entitled.-Alcoholic Beverage Control 
Act, § 7.1, providing for reinstatement of licenses to persons of 
Japanese ancestry, would not accomplish its purpose if limita-
tion of § 38f, with regard to number of licenses in a given 
area, were to apply to licenses formerly held by persons of 
Japanese ancestry, and restoration of such licenses should be 
effected automatically where neighborhood in question has re-
mained substantially the same as when licenses were revoked. 
[3] !d.-Licenses-Persons Entitled.-It is an abuse of discretion 
for State Board of Equalization to refuse to restore an off-sale 
liquor license to a person of Japanese ancestry pursuant to 
Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, § 7.1, where there has been 
no substantial change in neighborhood at time of his appli-
cation m; compared with time his license was revoked, where 
churches and sehools were in vicinity at all times and most 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Aleoholic Bev<>rag·es, § 20 Pt seq.; Am.Jur., 
Intoxicating Liquors, § 72 et seq. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1-3] Intoxicating Liquors, § 9.6. 
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of time since 1941 a license has been held by occupant of his 
premises, and where fact that an additional license has been 
granted to premises in neighborhood may not be considered 
under express wording of § 7.1. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Frank G. Swain, Judge. Affirmed. 
Proceeding in mandamus to compel State Board of Equal-
ization to restore to petitioner his off-sale liquor license. 
Judgment granting writ affirmed. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Alexander 
Googooian, Deputy Attorney General, for Appellants. 
James K. Mitsumori for Respondent. 
CARTER, J.-The State Board of Equalization, respondent 
in mandamus proceedings in the superior court, appeals from 
a judgment of that court granting a peremptory writ of 
mandate ordering the board to restore to Taenaka, petitioner, 
an off-sale liquor license at his premises on East 103d Street 
in Los Angeles. 
According to the findings, petitioner is a United States 
citizen of Japanese ancestry. He owns the above-mentioned 
premises, and in 1941, he held an off-sale liquor license at 
said premises regularly issued to him by respondent, and 
operated a liquor business thereunder. After the outbreak of 
the second World War and in May, 1942, respondent revoked 
and cancelled petitioner's license on the ground of his 
Japanese ancestry. In 1951, the Legislature added a section 
to the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act (Stats. 1935, p. 1123, 
as amended),* and pursuant thereto on September 4, 1951, 
*"Any individual, who held a license under this act on December 
7, 1941, and whose license was thereafter revoked because of the 
Japanese ancestry of the licensee, or surrendered, or was permitted 
to expire by such Japanese, may at any time within six months after 
the effective date of this section file an application for a similiar 
[sic] license, and the board shall issue such a license upon the pay-
ment of the current fee therefor. The provisions of Section 38f 
shall not apply to licenses issued to such persons. No license shall 
be issued pursuant to this section to a person who is not qualified 
to hold a license at the time of filing his application hereunder, and 
the issuance of such a license shall be subject to the approval of the 
hoard and other provisions of this act. The acceptance of a license 
issued pursuant to this section shall constitute a release of any and 
all claims for damages, if any there be, which the person to whom the 
license is issued may have against the State by reason of the revoca· 
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petitioner applied to the board for a license. On November 
15, 1951, the board, after hearing, granted the application 
and ordered the issuance of the license ''provided no protests 
have been filed against the issuance of such license." At that 
time no protests had been filed. Thereafter, on November 
26, 1951, protests were filed by a church, the Parent-Teachers 
Association, and John J. Hicks, president of South East 
Ministers' Alliance, on the ground that the premises were too 
close to a school and churches. At a meeting of the board 
on December 13, 1951, the matter of setting the protests for 
hearing was discussed in the presence of petitioner's counsel 
and Hicks. After some discussion in which one of the board 
members expressed his belief that there had been a fraud 
perpetrated on the board in the issuance of the license on 
November 15, 1951, because of petitioner's counsel's assur-
ance at the hearing thereon that no protests had been filed, 
a resolution was adopted that petitioner be requested to de-
liver his license to the custody of the state liquor adminis-
trator, and if he refused, proceedings for revocation of the 
license be initiated. Thereafter the same board member sug-
gested that as petitioner was going into military service the 
board keep custody of the license for a year. Petitioner's 
counsel said he would cooperate and recommended the pro-
cedure to his client but demanded a hearing on the protests. 
At his counsel's suggestion petitioner handed the license to 
the board. Hearings were held thereafter to consider the pro-
tests on the basis of petitio:ter's application for a license 
rather than as a basis for its revocation. All of the protests 
were withdrawn except that of Hicks which was on behalf of 
a church which moved into the area 400 feet from petitioner's 
premises and next door to a liquor store shortly before the 
license was issued on November 15, 1951, but had not yet 
opened as a church. In March, 1952, the board "denied" 
petitioner's application for a license on the basis that it would 
be contrary to ''public welfare and morals'' because of the 
proximity of the premises to churches and a school. 
tion, cancellation, or expiration of any license previously issued 
to or held by such person under this act; and provided further, that 
no such license or interest therein shall be subject to transfer by 
such person to any other transferee for a period of one year and 
thereafter only if such individual to whom such license has been 
restored hereunder has during such year as sole owner conducted 
the business operated under such license and personally, unless pre· 
vented by causes beyond his control, worked in the actual operation of 
said business." (Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, § 7.1, as added 
Stats. 1951, ch. 1457, § 1.) 
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'l'he court found that petitioner had been forced to deliver 
his license to the custody of the board; that it had not acted 
pursuant to law and petitioner's license had not been revoked. 
lt ordered the board to restore petitioner's license to him. 
Petitioner's main contentions in support of the writ of 
mandate are: (1) 'l'hat under section 7.1, supra, he was en-
titled to a license as a matter of right as long as the neigh-
borhood was substantially the same with reference to churches 
and schools when he applied as when he had a license in 1941 
and prior thereto; (2) that he did not lose his license by de-
livering it to the custody of the board because he was forced 
to make the delivery and that it did not constitute a revoca-
tion of it by the board; that where protests to the issuance of 
a license are filed after it is granted, as here, the board must 
bring and follow revocation proceedings as set forth in the 
act and this was not done. 
[1] Section 7.1 is a remedial provision in which the legis-
lative purpose was to rectify what the Legislature felt was 
an injustice, that is, the deprivation of persons of Japanese 
ancestry of liquor licenses held by them upon the ground of 
their ancestry. The patent object of this legislation was to 
restore such licenses to their former owners at positions form-
erly occupied by them. While the first part of the section 
speaks ·of application by the person for a license the latter 
part mentions restoration of it, plainly indicating that the 
main purpose is that the former licensee shall be restored 
to his former status. This is further evinced by the provision 
that states a license "shall" be issued to him upon the pay-
ment of the "current fee therefor," and that section 38f of the 
act shall not apply to such licenses. [2] That section de-
elares it to be for the public welfare and morals to limit the 
number of licenses in a given area. Plainly the section (7 .1) 
would not accomplish its purpose if that limitation applied 
to those lieenses beeause in most localities the quota of licenses 
would have been filled since the revocation in 1941 and 1942 
of licenses held by those with Japanese ancestry. There 
wonld be no room for any more and hence very few, if 
any, restorations could be made. The same is true in re-
gard to the character of the neighborhood in which the li-
cense is sought with reference to schools and churches. If 
the license is to be restored, and that is the declared policy 
of the section, then restoration should be effected where the 
neighborhood has remained substantially the same as when 
the lieense was revoked. If there has been no substantial 
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change then restoration follows automatically. That is the 
plain intent of section 7.1, sttpra. While it is provided in 
the section that the issuance of a license shall be subject to 
the rest of the act and the approval of the board, the rest of 
the section and its declared purpose show that it deals with 
matters other than the character of the neighborhood in which 
the licensee proposes to operate a liquor store under his license. 
[3] Here there is no question of petitioner's qualifications 
and it is clear that there had been no substantial change in 
the neighborhood at the time of his application as compared 
with the time his license was revoked. Churches and schools 
were in the vicinity at all times and most of the time since 
1941 a license has been held by the occupant of his premises. 
One church had taken some steps to locate in the vicinity, 
but had not yet become established and its proposed location 
is next door to a liquor store. It is true, as pointed out by 
respondent, an additional license has been granted to premises 
in the neighborhood, but as heretofore mentioned, that is not 
a factor to be considered under the express wording of sec-
tion 7 .1, supra. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court's 
judgment was correct in determining that the board acted 
arbitrarily and abused its discretion in refusing to issue 
petitioner a license or in refusing to deliver back to him the 
license issued on November 15, 1951. 
Petitioner urges that where a license is issued and there-
after protests to its issuance are filed, the only proper steps 
are for proceedings to revoke the license, and therein the 
protests are considered as the complaint for revocation ( Alco-
holic Beverage Control Act, § 39) ; that such was the case 
here because the license was issued on November 15, 1951, and 
the protests were filed thereafter; that the procedure under 
section 39 was not followed ; (what was done has heretofore 
been indicated) that he was coerced by the board in delivering 
the issued license to its custody and continuing with the 
improper proceedings and thus he did not waive his right to 
complain. Respondent contends that petitioner was not 
coerced, and has waived and is estopped to complain of the 
procedure followed. No doubt the procedure followed by 
the board was irregular and it should be noted that there 
was no occasion for it, in effect, to threaten petitioner with 
revocation because of alleged false representations at the 
hearing leading to the issuance of the license on November 15, 
1951. The only representation of any consequence made, was 
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that no protests to the issuance of the license had been filed. 
That was true. In view, however, of the result reached, 
that is, that petitioner is entitled to a license, it becomes 
unnecessary to pass upon those contentions. Presumably 
the license issued on November 15, 1951, was still in the custody 
of the board, and while his ''application'' was later ''denied'' 
after the subsequent hearings, there has been no order re-
voking it. But even if we consider that he surrendered it, 
then he is entitled to have a new one issued. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
SHENK, J.-I dissent. Under section 22 of article XX of 
the Constitution as amended in 1934 the State Board of Equali-
zation has the ''exclusive power to license'' the ''sale of intoxi-
cating liquors in this State" and has "the power, in its discre-
tion, to deny or revoke any specific liquor license if it shall 
determine for good cause that the granting or continuance of 
such license would be contrary to public welfare or morals.'' 
The majority opinion correctly states that "the board 'denied' 
petitioner's application for a license on the basis that it would 
be contrary to 'public welfare and morals' because of the 
proximity of the premises to churches and a school.'' 
Whatever may have theretofore transpired it is stated and 
conceded by the majority that the proceedings before the board 
were conducted on the basis of an application by the petitioner 
for a license and a hearing thereon in the presence of protests 
rather than on the basis of the revocation of a license thereto-
fore granted. The question of the discretion of the board in 
denying the license is in the very heart of the whole proceeding. 
The evidence before the board was abundantly sufficient to 
support the conclusion of the board that the granting of the 
license would be contrary to public welfare and morals. There 
is no evidence that the board acted arbitrarily or capriciously. 
The District Court of Appeal of the Second Appellate District, 
Division 2, reversed the judgment herein relying largely on 
the case of Weiss v. State Board of Equalization (not men-
tioned in the majority opinion), wherein this court in April, 
1953 (40 Cal.2d 772 [256 P.2d 1]), outlined the discretionary 
powers of the board and upheld its action in denying a liquor 
license on premises in the proximity of a public school. For the 
foregoing reasons and the additional reasons stated in the 
opinion of the District Court of Appeal written by Mr. ,Ju.stice 
Apr.1954] PEOPLE v. WOLFE 
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Fox and reported in volume 258 of the Pacific Reporter begin-
ning at page 1079 I would reverse the judgment and thus up-
hold the action of the board in denying the license. 
Edmonds, J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied April 28, 
1954. Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Schauer, J., were of the 
opinion that the petition should be granted. 
[Crim. No. 5532. In Bank. Apr. 2, 1954.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. JAMES FRANKLIN 
WOLFE et al., Appellants. 
[1] Criminal Law- Appeal- Harmless Error- Misconduct of 
Prosecuting Attorney.-It was not prejudicial misconduct for 
prosecuting attorney in a murder case to ask defendant if he 
left his knife in victim's back, where there was no objection by 
defense counsel nor any motion to strike, and where jury was 
instructed that it was sole judge of value and effect of evi-
dence, that it could not convict defendant on mere suspicion, 
that prosecution was bound to establish defendant's guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt, and that, unless it did so, it was jury's 
duty to find defendant not guilty. 
[2] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting At-
torney.-While it was highly improper for prosecuting attorney 
in a murder case to comment, in his closing argument to jury, 
on failure to produce certain witnesses and to state that the 
witnesses, if produced, would have been too honest to perjure 
themselves for defendants and afraid to testify for the People, 
such misconduct was not so prejudicial to defendants as to 
result in a miscarriage of justice where evidence of their guilt 
was overwhelming. ( Const., art. VI, § 4lf2.) 
[3] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error- Instructions- Confessions.-
Refusal to instruct jury in a murder case that a confession 
must be free and voluntary did not result in prejudice to de-
fendants where, on being questioned immediately after crime, 
they insisted that the killing was done because deceased was 
out to "get" them, where court reporter, who was present at 
time, testified that defendants' statements were not made 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, §§ 1404(8), 1407(5); 
[2) Criminal Law, § 1404(18); [3] Criminal Law, § 1434; [4] 
Homicide, §§ 189, 190; [5] Criminal Law, § 734; [6] Homicide, 
§ 222. 
